

- Eight officers (28%), two sergeants (40%) and one lieutenant (50%) were found to be out of compliance for CPT Cycle 2013/2014. Seven of the officers were out of compliance for Perishable Skills and the eighth was out of compliance for CPT. The two sergeants were out of compliance for Perishable Skills. The lieutenant was out of compliance for CPT.
- Six officers and two sergeants were out of compliance in both two-year cycles.

The POST Compliance Analysis for Dispatchers that was provided for review only covered the two-year cycle 2013/2014. It showed that seven of the nine dispatchers were in compliance, while two were "in a grace period" for that cycle.

Finally, we reviewed Supervisor's Briefing Reports for November and December 2014 to determine how training subjects were addressed at patrol roll calls. While there is no set Roll-Call Training Plan, some form of roll call training was provided during each shift, though it usually lasted only a few minutes. Most roll call training (90%) consisted of the sergeant or officer acting as OIC reading a different section of the Policy Manual. Some training consisted of videos of "One Minute Briefs," and other training consisted of debriefing previous incidents the supervisor felt would be beneficial.

### Improvements

The Department expends an average of about 50 hours per employee each year on training. While not exorbitant, it is a significant commitment to ensuring that its personnel receive the basic training required for them to do their jobs well. It is also a significant financial investment and someone needs to be responsible for ensuring that investment is spent wisely. That person also needs to ensure that the Department is fulfilling its mandated training requirements both for POST as well as specialty training required by law, e.g., sex crime training for investigators. The Department needs an annual training plan and it should designate a non-field sergeant as the Department's Training Coordinator. It should also activate the Training Committee described in its Manual and require the committee to review all significant incidents that occur in order to enhance its training program. Sergeants need to accept responsibility for ensuring their subordinates receive adequate training and they should be reviewing their training in conjunction with each employee's annual personnel evaluation.

### Recommendations:

- ❖ **The Department needs to prepare a comprehensive written Training Plan for each year. That plan should be completed by December 1<sup>st</sup> of the preceding year.<sup>27</sup> (Trng No. 1)**
- ❖ **A sergeant (not a lieutenant) should be assigned as the Department's Training Coordinator. That sergeant can be assigned other duties, but training is a critical function and should not be added onto a field supervisor's workload. (Trng No. 2)**
- ❖ **The Training Committee needs to be activated and should consist of the Training Coordinator as chair, one or two field sergeants, 2 or 3 field officers, a detective and a dispatcher. (Trng No. 3)**
- ❖ **A written procedure needs to be established for employee's to request training. (Trng No. 4)**

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<sup>27</sup> The Department obtained El Centro PD's Training Plan to use as a guide.

- ❖ Training requests for non-mandated training need to identify the officers' current level of compliance with mandated training requirements. (Trng No. 5)
- ❖ Supervisors, all of whom have the ability to ascertain if officers review training bulletins, should be responsible for ensuring their officers review the bulletins. (Trng No. 6)
- ❖ Supervisors need to conduct an annual training-needs assessment for each of their subordinates. This is best done in conjunction with annual personnel evaluations. (Trng No. 7)
- ❖ The Training Coordinator should publish a monthly roll call training plan with about 60% to 70% of the sessions pre-determined and the reminder left to the individual supervisor's discretion. (Trng No. 8)

## XII. RISK MANAGEMENT

This chapter reviewed the high-risk events inherent in police work: Personnel Complaints, Uses of Force, Vehicular Pursuits and Traffic Collisions. These events were assessed for the five year period of 2010 through 2014. Department files were examined along with RMS data. Department managers were interviewed to clarify any issues that arose. In addition to reviewing individual events we also reviewed the way in which Department managers reviewed these events collectively, along with any claims for damages or lawsuits the events may have generated.

### Personnel Complaints

#### **Policy & Legal Requirements**

Personnel complaints are governed both by law as well as agency policy. With respect to legal requirements, California Penal Code Section 832.5 requires that:

*"Each department or agency in this state that employs peace officers shall establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against the personnel of these departments or agencies and shall make a written description of the procedure available to the public."*

Penal Code Section 832.5 goes on to state (in pertinent part) that:

*"The department or agency shall provide written notification to the complaining party of the disposition of the complaint within 30 days of the disposition" and,*

*"Complaints and any reports or findings related to those complaints shall be retained for a period of at least five years" and,*

*All complaints retained pursuant to this subdivision may be maintained either in the peace r custodial officer's general personnel file or in a separate file...." and,*

*"Complaints and any reports or findings related to those complaints shall be retained for a period of at least five years."*

The California State Attorney General has issued a formal opinion that:

*"A California law enforcement agency may destroy peace officer internal investigation files after a five-year retention period ... when the destruction is solely a matter of administrative routine and no other factors are present that would establish 'bad faith.'"*<sup>28</sup>

In that opinion, the Attorney General went on to note that:

*"As a matter of prudent policy, a law enforcement agency may determine that a longer period would promote greater public confidence in its procedures and practices."*

In accordance with Government Code Section 34090, police departments are allowed to destroy personnel complaint files older than five years; however, most local ordinances requires that the department obtain approval from their city council prior to destroying any personnel complaint files.

Calexico's policy defines a personnel complaint as an allegation of misconduct or improper job performance which, if true, would constitute a violation of Department policy, federal state or local law.<sup>29</sup> Any other "inquiry about employee conduct" may be handled informally by a department supervisor and is not considered to be a personnel complaint. (There is no reporting or review requirement for a complaint a supervisor deems to be informal.)

Personnel complaints are classified in one of the following categories:

- **Informal** - The complainant is satisfied with the action taken by a supervisor of rank greater than the accused employee. An informal complaint "need not be documented on a personnel complaint form" and the supervisor can "handle the complaint in any manner consistent with this policy."
- **Formal** - The complainant requests further investigation or the supervisor determines further action is warranted. A formal complaint may be investigated by a supervisor of greater rank than the accused or referred to Internal Affairs depending on the seriousness and complexity of the investigation.
- **Incomplete** – The complainant either refuses to cooperate or is unavailable after diligent follow-up investigation. "At the discretion of the assigned supervisor or the Internal Affairs Unit, such matters need not be documented as personnel complaints, but may be further investigated depending on the seriousness of the complaint and the availability of sufficient information."

The policy requires that personnel complaint forms be readily available in the station lobby. It also requires that any Department employee who becomes aware of alleged misconduct notify a supervisor immediately and the supervisor is required to interview the complainant. The supervisor is to obtain as much information as possible including medical attention and photographs of any alleged injuries. If the supervisor determines the complaint is informal, he "may elect to document" it on his log. (This requirement is in the Policy Manual even though Calexico's field supervisors do not complete a daily log.) But if the complaint is formal, he is required to complete a personnel complaint form and forwarded it to the employee's commanding officer.

The commanding officer may either "take appropriate action or forward the complaint to Internal Affairs Unit for further action." However, primary responsibility for the investigation of a personnel

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<sup>28</sup> California Attorney General Opinion 99-1111 issued May 2, 2000

<sup>29</sup> Department Manual Section 1020

complaint rests with the employee's immediate supervisor. The Chief of Police or his designee may direct that another supervisor investigate the matter.

If the complaint involves potential criminal conduct, a separate supervisor or detective shall be assigned to investigate the criminal allegations apart from the administrative investigation. In serious cases, the Chief may request that an outside law enforcement agency conduct the criminal investigation.

Administrative investigations shall be reported in the following format:

- **Introduction** – General background information
- **Synopsis** – Summary of the facts
- **Summary of Allegations** – A brief summary of each allegation and the evidence relevant to it. "A separate recommended finding should be provided for each allegation."
- **Evidence for Each Allegation** – Detail the evidence applicable to each allegation including a summary of statements and other evidence.
- **Conclusion** – "A recommendation regarding further action or disposition should be provided."
- **Exhibits** – a list of all recordings, photos,, documents, etc.

Allegations are to be classified using one of the following dispositions:

- **Unfounded** – The investigation disclosed that the alleged act did not occur or did not involve Department personnel. Frivolous complaints fall within this classification (Penal Code Section 832.5c).
- **Exonerated** – The investigation disclosed that the alleged act occurred, but it was justified, lawful and/or proper.
- **Not Sustained** – The investigation disclosed insufficient evidence to sustain the complaint or fully exonerate the employee.
- **Sustained** – The investigation disclosed sufficient evidence to establish that the act occurred and that it constituted misconduct.

The completed investigation is forwarded through the chain of command to the employee's commanding officer who reviews the entire investigative file, the employee's personnel file and any other relevant materials. If the commanding officer determines the investigation is deficient, he can return it for further investigation. If he determines it is sufficient, he will make recommendations regarding each allegation and the amount of discipline, if any, to be imposed. The matter is then forwarded to the Chief of Police who can accept or modify the classification and recommendations contained in the report.

Sustained complaints are maintained in the employee's personnel file. All other complaints are maintained by IA apart from the employee's personnel file. Formal complaints are maintained for no less than five years and internally initiated complaints are maintained no less than 2 years.

**Practice**

There is literally no way to determine how many personnel complaints occur in Calexico. The current policy allows a supervisor to handle a complaint informally and there is no requirement that the supervisor document an informal investigation. Consequently there is no way to know when this occurs and there is no management review of those decisions.

With respect to formal investigations, we reviewed the Department's Internal Affairs files for the past five years (2010 through 2014). The files are maintained in a locked cabinet and packages are generally well maintained. In two cases the Department was unable to locate the packages (2011-06 and 2011-07). Additionally, there was no disposition indicated in the package on four cases (2010-01, 2010-09, 2011-04 and 2013-01). The formal complaints appear to have been brought to a supervisor's attention in a timely manner. Additionally, the citizen complaint form and instructions (printed front-to-back on one piece of paper) are available in English as well as Spanish. The form heavily emphasizes personal liability for filing a false complaint (Section 148.6 P.C.) and could be construed as inhibiting the filing of a complaint.<sup>30</sup>

In this stage of our review we made no findings as to the quality of the investigations or appropriateness of the adjudications. The Department has brought in outside resources to investigate several current cases and we did not want to interfere with that work. However, the following chart shows the types of complaints handled as a formal complaint for the past five years. Most of those complaints were Department initiated for offences such as a traffic collision (TC), neglect of duty (NOD) or conduct unbecoming an officer (CUBO).

**Formal Personnel Complaints 2010-2014**

Year	Formal Complaints	Department Initiated			Community Complaints			
		TC	NOD	CUBO	Use of Force	Demeanor	NOD	False Arrest
2010	9	2	0	3	3	1	0	0
2011	8	3	2	0	1	0	0	0
2012	17	8	3	2	0	2	1	1
2013	17	2	6	2	2	2	1	2
2014	26	0	8	9	3	4	0	2

While not all of the complaints have been adjudicated particularly the more recent ones, it is instructive to note that in five years there has only been one sustained community complaint. That complaint alleged that an officer issued a citation in retaliation for the complainant demanding to speak with a supervisor. It is also interesting to note the small number of complaints involving force and arrests. While there is no way to know how many informal complaints involved either of these allegations, even the most diligent police force tends to generate more of these complaints than are found here particularly when force is used rather frequently as noted in the following section.

<sup>30</sup> The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has issued an opinion in *Chaker v. Crogan* (Case No. 03-5688) that Section 148.6 P.C., Knowingly Filing a False Complaint of Peace Officer Misconduct, is unconstitutional. The court found that the section criminalizes knowingly false speech critical of peace officer conduct, but leaves unregulated knowingly false speech supportive of peace officer conduct. That decision is under appeal.

### Improvements

The Department's policy and practice for handling personnel complaints needs to be improved in several areas. First and foremost, **every** community complaint needs to be documented by a supervisor and reviewed by a manager. Sergeants can still handle complaints informally, but they need to report it to their lieutenant in writing and the lieutenant needs to sign his concurrence. Informal complaints need to be retained so they can be located and any emerging patterns identified.

When a formal complaint is initiated, Internal Affairs needs to be notified and make the decision on whether they will handle or refer it to the employee's command for investigation. There is no way to know when a complaint is part of a larger IA case or broader issue, so the investigative decision needs to be made at the IA level. Additionally, every manager who reviews a personnel complaint should document their findings and recommendations in writing. This can be as simple as adding a check box to the form and having the manager check the box, enter the date of adjudication and sign the form.

Current policy requires that the supervisor who investigated the complaint make recommendations on the complaint's disposition. But sound risk-management control principles require that there be a separation of duties between those who investigate personnel complaints and those who adjudicate them.<sup>31</sup> In other words, the investigator's job should be to conduct a thorough investigation, gather all the evidence (physical, scientific, testimonial, documentary, etc.) and submit a well-documented report of his/her findings. The adjudicator's job then is to review that investigation, ensure it is complete, identify the final allegations and recommend the appropriate disposition for each allegation. Simply put, investigators should not adjudicate and adjudicators should not investigate.

### Recommendations:

- ❖ **Remove any language from the citizen complaint form that could be construed as dissuading a complainant from filing a personnel complaint. (RM No. 1)**
- ❖ **Require supervisors to document every community complaint and forward either a personnel complaint form or supervisor's log to their division commander. (RM No. 2)**
- ❖ **The division commander should adjudicate each complaint in writing. (RM No. 3)**
- ❖ **All formal complaints should be sent to IA and IA should determine the appropriate investigative entity. (RM No. 4)**
- ❖ **The supervisor investigating a personnel complaint should not make recommendations regarding the complaint's adjudication. (RM No. 5)**
- ❖ **There needs to be a clear written record of each adjudicator's review and findings for every personnel complaint. (RM No. 6)**
- ❖ **The Chief of Police's Administrative Assistant should maintain an automated matrix of all personnel complaints.<sup>32</sup> (RM No. 7)**

<sup>31</sup> This would apply to other administrative investigations as well including uses of force, pursuits, or traffic collisions.

<sup>32</sup> The Chief's Administrative Assistant was provided with a model matrix for that purpose.

## Uses of Force

### **Policy**

Department Policy Section 300.4 requires supervisory notification as soon as practical following the application of physical force under any of the following circumstances:

- a) The application of force appears to have caused physical injury
- b) The individual has expressed a complaint of pain
- c) Any application of a control device
- d) The individual has been rendered unconscious.

When a supervisor is able to respond to a use-of-force incident the supervisor is expected to:

- a) Obtain the basic facts from the involved officer(s)
- b) Ensure that any injured parties are examined and treated
- c) Separately interview the subject(s) upon whom force was applied
- d) Ensure that photographs have been taken of any areas involving visible injury or complaint of pain as well as overall photographs of uninjured areas
- e) Identify any witnesses not already included in related reports
- f) Review and approve all related reports

In the event the supervisor "believes the incident may give rise to potential civil litigation, a separate potential claim form should be completed and routed to appropriate channels." If the supervisor determines that any application of force was not within policy, a separate internal administrative investigation should be initiated. If the supervisor is unable to respond to the scene the supervisor is still expected to "complete as many of the above items as circumstances permit."

With respect to the use of chemical agents, the policy requires that all uses of chemical agents shall be "documented in the related arrest/crime report and noted in the department use of force form." However, the policy manual does not address a "use-of-force form" even though the Department does, in fact, have one.

### **Practice**

Department policy requires supervisory notification whenever a reportable use of force occurs, but the supervisor is only required to complete a report if, in his opinion, the incident "may give rise to potential civil litigation" or the force used was out of policy. The supervisor's report is routed to the Operations Lieutenant for review and retention. If the supervisor determines the incident was in policy and may not result in litigation, no report is required. As field supervisors do not complete a log, the incident is never documented and there is no management review of the field supervisor's determinations. As a result, there is no way to determine how many actual uses of force occurred during this five year period.

We did find that 134 use-of-force reports had been completed during the five year period. Every one of those cases included a use-of-force report and a supervisor's report which summarized the incident in great detail and provided good insight into the incident. Department supervisors are to be

commended for their diligence in completing those reports. Though the Use-of-Force Form contains a space for the manager to sign, only one of the 134 forms we reviewed contained a manager's signature. None of the reports contained a policy finding by a manager and we found 24 use-of-force reports that were not in the package maintained by the Operations Lieutenant. Given the high criteria for completing a report, these missing reports present a serious risk-management exposure. Finally, in one use of force that involved a serious injury (dislocated elbow) to the suspect, the reports attached to the use-of-force form were for a completely unrelated incident (traffic collision).

### **Improvements**

**Every** reportable use of force needs to be investigated, documented, reviewed and retained. Additionally, a supervisor needs to respond to the scene when force is used and when he cannot he needs to document why he could not do so. The current policy and practice with respect to reporting use-of-force incidents presents a serious risk exposure and needs to be corrected immediately.

#### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Supervisors should respond to every use of force and when they cannot they should be required to document the reason. (RM No. 8)**
- ❖ **Every use of force should be reported on a use-of-force report. (RM No. 9)**
- ❖ **Every use of force should be routed to the Operations Lieutenant for review and policy determination. (RM No. 10)**
- ❖ **The Operations Lieutenant's should determine in writing if the use of force was: 1) In Policy, No Action; 2) In Policy, Training; or, 3) Out of Policy. (RM No. 11)**
- ❖ **The Operations Lieutenant should maintain an automated matrix that captures important information for all uses of force.<sup>33</sup> (RM No. 12)**

### **Vehicular Pursuits**

#### **Policy**

The Department has an extensive policy governing vehicular pursuits (Policy Section 314). The policy requires that the primary pursuing officer complete the CHP Form 187A, Allied Agency Vehicle Pursuit Report, submit it to the shift supervisor for review and file it with the CHP within 30 days of the pursuit.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, a field supervisor is required to complete a Supervisor's Log and submit it to his department manager briefly summarizing the pursuit including:

1. Date and time of pursuit
2. Length of pursuit
3. Involved units and officers
4. Initial reason for pursuit
5. Starting and termination points
6. Disposition, arrest, citation, etc. Arrestee information should be provided if applicable

<sup>33</sup> The Operations Lieutenant was provided a model matrix for that purpose

<sup>34</sup> The CHP Form includes a box titled, "Supervisor's Initials."

7. Injuries and/or property damage
8. Medical treatment
9. Name of supervisor at scene
10. A preliminary determination that the pursuit appears to be in compliance with this policy OR additional review and/or follow-up is warranted

All pursuit reports are supposed to be routed to the Operational Services Lieutenant. The Lieutenant is supposed to review the reports, make a policy determination and retained the reports in a package filed by year. The Records Clerk processing the reports is also supposed to enter a code into RMS indicating that a vehicular pursuit was involved. Ideally, those two files (the lieutenant's folder and RMS printout) should match.

### **Practice**

None of the pursuit reports contained a Supervisor's Log as required by Department's policy. Each of the CHP Forms did have initials in the "supervisory review" box, but there was no evidence of supervisory or managerial review of the pursuit. In no case was there any indication of a finding as to the pursuit's compliance with Department policy or lack thereof.

The lieutenant was unable to locate any folder of pursuits for 2010 or 2014. So there is no evidence of managerial review of any pursuits during those two years. For the other three years, the reports in the folder did not match the reports on the RMS printout:

- Of the 10 reports located for 2011, only 4 were in the Lieutenant's folder and 1 was not on the RMS printout.
- Of the 10 reports located for 2012, only 6 were in the Lieutenant's folder and 5 were not on the RMS printout.
- Of the 5 reports located for 2013, only 3 were in the Lieutenant's folder and 2 were not on the RMS printout.

A chart identifying each pursuit and where it was located is provided in **Appendix F**.

### **Improvements**

Vehicular pursuits are by nature a high-risk event posing a significant danger to the pursuing officers as well as the public. Many end in traffic collisions occasionally involving innocent motorists. They generate intense media attention as well as claims for damages and law suits. That extreme risk level notwithstanding, there is no way to tell with any reasonable degree of confidence how many vehicular pursuits occurred during this five-year period. Of the reports that were located, it does not appear that managers reviewed let alone made policy determinations on nearly half the reports. In no case did a supervisor submit a report as required by policy. This is wholly unacceptable by any managerial standard.

### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Supervisors need to be held accountable for complying with Department policy regarding the investigation and reporting of pursuits. (RM No. 13)**

- ❖ Department managers need to review every pursuit and maintain a matrix of information for each pursuit.<sup>35</sup> (RM No. 14)
- ❖ Department policy needs to be amended to require managerial review and policy determination for all vehicular pursuits. (RM No. 15)
- ❖ Department policy needs to be amended to have the Operations Lieutenant submit the CHP form after his review, not the pursuing officer. (RM No. 16)

### Officer-Involved Traffic Collisions

#### Policy

Department Manual Section 502.4 requires completion of a Traffic Collision Investigation Report when a City-owned vehicle is involved in a traffic collision resulting in any damage or injury. If the collision involves a Department employee, an on-duty supervisor is required to investigate the incident and forward a memorandum to the appropriate Division Commander. However, if a Department employee, on or off duty, is involved in a collision within the City of Calexico that results in serious injury or death, the supervisor "may notify the CHP for assistance" (emphasis added.)

#### Practice

The review of personnel complaints included several traffic collisions. It appears those incidents were reported in a timely manner, investigated by a supervisor and adjudicated by a manager. As with the other personnel complaints, we made no finding as to the quality of the investigation or appropriateness of the adjudication.

#### Improvements

The Department's policy provides no guidance on when the CHP should be notified of a serious traffic incident and there is no guidance on the standard that is to be used to adjudicate employee-involved traffic collisions. Some agencies discipline employees they find to be negligent, others discipline if the employee is at fault and still others expect employees to use good defensive driving practices. It appears that Calexico uses the "at fault" standard which is fine, but it should be articulated in the policy.

#### Recommendations:

- ❖ Department policy should be amended to require that the CHP be requested to assume responsibility for investigating serious accidents involving a Department employee. (RM No. 17)
- ❖ Department policy should identify the standard it uses to determine if an employee should be disciplined for a traffic collision. (RM No. 18)

### Risk Management Committee

#### Policy & Practice

There is no provision in the Department's Policy Manual or in practice for Department managers to conduct periodic reviews of high-risk events. That includes work groups or individual employees who have been disproportionately involved in high-risk events.

<sup>35</sup> The Operations Lieutenant was provided with a recommended matrix for that purpose.

### **Improvements**

Even if Department managers did receive and review every high-risk event, most modern law enforcement agencies conduct periodic reviews of these events to determine if there is any pattern for its work groups or individual employees. This is not to say or imply in any way that active officers or work groups are inherently problematic, only that levels of activity and patterns need to be identified and reviewed to ensure that police work is being conducted in a manner consistent with the Department's expectations.

#### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **The Department should activate a Risk Management Committee. (RM No. 19)**
- ❖ **The Risk Management Committee should meet quarterly to review all high-risk activities including personnel complaints, uses of force, vehicular pursuits and traffic collisions. (RM No. 20)**
- ❖ **The Risk Management Committee should also review the issuance, use and maintenance of all safety equipment to ensure those items are being deployed properly and that any perishable items are within the manufacturer's expiration or replacement date. (RM No. 21)**
- ❖ **The City Attorney should attend Risk Management Committee meetings to discuss claims for damages and lawsuits as well as provide the Department with legal advice on risk-management issues. (RM No. 22)**

### **Booking Approval**

Calexico allows its officers to arrest and book suspect with no documentation of supervisory review or approval. After the suspect is booked, the officer completes an arrest report which is approved by a supervisor. But by then the suspect has already been booked and there is no opportunity to review the arrest or correct the charge if it is not supported by the evidence. Most police departments today require written approval from a supervisor before a suspect can be booked. They also require the supervisor to personally inspect and interview the arrestee particularly if the charge is battery on an officer or interfering with a police investigation. (Experience has shown those to be the most common charges when an officer unnecessarily resorts to force rather than persuasion in handling a difficult situation.) Calexico would do well to adopt those industry standards.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ❖ **Require written supervisory approval for all arrests prior to booking. (RM No. 23)**
- ❖ **If the charge involves battery or assault on an officer or resisting or interfering with an officer, the approving supervisor must personally inspect and briefly interview the arrestee. (RM No. 24)**
- ❖ **If the arrest involves a use of force, the supervisor reporting the use of force should be the same supervisor approving the booking and all related reports. (RM No. 25)**

### XIII. RECORDS

#### Policy

Section 806 of the Department Manual is dedicated to records. That section titled "Records Bureau Procedures" is, once again, extremely generic and provides little or no guidance on the procedures it supposedly establishes. Specifically, it contains the following provision:

##### *806.1 Purpose and Scope*

*The Records Supervisor shall maintain the Department Records Bureau Procedures Manual on a current basis to reflect the procedures being followed within the Records Bureau. Policies and procedures that apply to all employees of this department are contained in this chapter.*

There is no "Records Supervisor," there is no "Records Bureau Procedures Manual" and there is no "Records Bureau." The Manual Section goes on to (briefly) require that reports be issued a sequential number, limit report access to Records personnel and place restrictions on accessing original records. Inexplicably this chapter includes a section on how everyone throughout the Department should request supplies (Manual Section 806.3). But there is no Manual provision designating anyone as the Department's Custodian of Records, which is a major policy deficiency.

#### Recommendations:

- ❖ **Designate the Lead Records Clerk as the Department's Custodian of Records for all Department crime and arrest reports other than those maintained by specialized units. (Rec No. 1)**
- ❖ **Designate the Chief's Executive Assistant as the Custodian of Records for all other reports including correspondence, personnel records and personnel complaints. (Rec No. 2)**

Manual Section 810 contains procedures for the "Release of Records and Information" but it does not include any procedures specific to records.

#### Practice

Records is arguable the Department entity that has been impacted most by the disorganization and lack of cohesive policies that were rampant before the recent leadership change. The Records Unit had, in effect, become the focal point for criminal filings, seeking arrest warrants and providing some modicum of quality control. These responsibilities are hardly appropriate for a two-person unit that does not have a supervisor, receives little formal training and has no visible management oversight of the day-to-day decisions being made by the two Records Clerks assigned there. This in no way should reflect negatively on the clerks assigned to Records; the Department's disorganization created a vacuum and the Clerks did the best they could to fill it.

Along with these added, albeit unofficial duties came a significant backlog in Record's' ability to do its regular work. As of February 2015, we estimate that Records has a three to four month backlog in processing reports. That conclusion is supported by the paperwork that is literally piled two-feet thick on the Records Clerks' desks. The amount of clutter does not instill confidence that everything will end up where it is supposed to be and these are official Department records.

### Records Room Operations

For the last three years there have only been two Records Clerks assigned to Records.<sup>36</sup> (There used to be a supervisor and four clerks, but that was reduced gradually over the years due to budget cuts.) There is no supervisor and both Clerks are of equal rank and position within the Unit. (Each Clerk has about 30 years with the Department.) The Records Unit itself is staffed Monday through Friday from about 6 AM until 5 PM. One Clerk comes in at 6 AM to process in-custody cases and the other Clerk stays late to provide coverage until 5 PM. (The Clerks alternate those shifts.) The Clerks are both on a 9/80 schedule and alternate Fridays off.

When someone enters the police station they reach the public counter. For years the counter has been open to the public from 8 AM until 5 PM Monday through Friday. Primarily the counter is staffed by a Parking Control Officer because most of the public inquiries deal with parking issues. But Records Clerks are there to handle records inquiries which occur 15 to 20 times a day. These frequent interruptions are one of several factors contributing to the Records backlog. (The other factors are discussed below.)

There is no current policy or procedural manual for Records. The two Clerks have been doing their job so long they pretty much know what to do mechanically. But when it comes to broad issues such as prioritization of work, they each do their work as they see fit. They deal almost exclusively with the day-to-day processing of reports and do not address long-range issues. For example old records have not been purged for ten to fifteen years so they now have two large cargo containers in the parking lot to store old files.

### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Reduce the public hours for records and eliminate public access on Fridays.<sup>37</sup> (Rec No. 3)**
- ❖ **Designate one of the Records Clerks as the Lead and compensate her accordingly. (Rec No. 4)**
- ❖ **In consultation with the other Clerks and the Support Lieutenant, have the Lead Records Clerk identify broad issues such as prioritization and develop policies to address those issues. (Rec No. 5)**
- ❖ **Maintain the reduced hours for the public counter in order to eliminate the backlog of files. (Rec No. 6)**
- ❖ **Once the backlog is eliminated, use the extra time to prepare a Destruction of Records request. (Rec No. 7)**

### Report Process

In order to fully comprehend how Records functions, it is important to know how records come to them from patrol. The patrol officer completing a report decides if it warrants additional investigation. If he decides no follow-up is required, he "toggles" a box on the electronic report and forwards it to his sergeant. The supervisor approves the report and forwards it to Records where it is filed because the "no follow-up" box has been checked. Detectives never receive a copy of these reports regardless of

<sup>36</sup> A third Clerk was added in March 2015.

<sup>37</sup> The Department implemented this recommendation during the course of this engagement.

the crime categorization or potential for it to be connected with other cases. (Robberies and burglaries are seldom "stand alone" crimes.) If the patrol officer makes a mistake and the supervisor doesn't correct it, the detectives never see the report.

When an officer decides additional investigation is warranted, he may (and often does) decide to conduct the additional investigation himself. There is no evidence of supervisory involvement in those decisions and detectives are not notified. When the officer decides the investigation is completed he closes the case and is supposed to submit the report(s). During our review of cases for the Detective portion of this study, we found several felony investigations that had been closed by patrol officers even though there were strong investigative leads including video recordings of the crimes.

When a report is completed with a named suspect who is not in custody, the patrol officer sends it to Records to obtain an arrest warrant. The Records Unit prepares a warrant package and submits it to the District Attorney's Office. Detectives are seldom brought into that process.

When a suspect is taken into custody **for any charge**, the Records Unit prepares a filing package for submission to the DA for filing consideration. That occurs even if the arrestee was involved in a crime that may well be connected to other crimes, e.g., robbery or burglary, or a crime with a distinct Modus Operandi (MO). These reports are submitted to the prosecutor without any involvement by the detectives. This practice undoubtedly results in the submission of incomplete investigations for prosecution and leaves many crimes unsolved when they could be connected to the suspect(s) in custody.

**Note:** Recommendations to correct these deficiencies were made in the Detective Chapter of this report.

But all that pales in comparison to the practice of submitting reports months after they were reported. As mentioned earlier, the Department's policy required officers to submit their reports by the end of their work week. But that was not occurring in Calexico for many years. Instead, every December Records would send out a list of all the reports that were supposed to have been submitted in the preceding year and officers scrambled frantically to submit those reports. But that list got so long that it virtually shut the Department down every December while officers tried to find (and remember) the facts of cases long since forgotten. It also impacted Records in January and February while they tried to process the onslaught of dated reports. To solve that problem, the Department decided to hold the "report search" every quarter which they did until recently. When this issue was brought to the attention of the Department's new leadership, a directive was issued requiring every report to be submitted before the officer's end of watch. A supervisor could approve an extension, but the supervisor had to submit a written rationale for the extension.

**Recommendation:**

- ❖ **Codify the policy of requiring all reports to be submitted before end of watch into the Department Manual. (Rec No. 8)**

Finally, many of the reports we reviewed were replete with very obvious spelling and grammatical errors. It is extremely unlikely that the supervisors who approved those reports ever actually read them. To compensate for this shortcoming, Records Clerks have been trying to correct at least the most egregious errors. This takes time and has contributed to their backlog.

**Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Supervisors need to be put on notice that their approval of a report indicates they have read it, understood it, determined it to be legally sufficient and found it to be free of at least egregious spelling and grammatical errors. (Rec No. 9)**
- ❖ **The Operations Lieutenant needs to become more actively involved in checking the quality of completed reports. That could be as simple as selecting a “grab sample” of reports two or three times a week and reviewing them for consistency with Department standards. Any deficiencies should be brought to the approving supervisor’s attention. Chronic deficiencies should result in appropriate action including, but not limited to, training or discipline. (Rec No. 10)**

**Improvements**

Right now, the Records Unit is completely cluttered with backlogged reports and duties that should be assigned to someone else. There simply is no way to assess the proper staffing and paper flow for Records until those hindrances are removed. Once the “decks are cleared” additional work will need to be done to ensure the Department’s Records Unit is working efficiently and effectively.

**Recommendation:**

- ❖ **Review the Records function in detail to determine if a full time supervisor and/or an additional Records Clerk is warranted. (Rec No. 11)**
- ❖ **Conduct a “time-and-motion” study to determine how paperwork flows through the Records Unit and make recommendations for any improvements needed. (Rec No. 12)**

**Note:** A time-and-motion study is a business efficiency technique that combines the Time Study work of Frederick Winslow Taylor with the Motion Study work of Frank and Lillian Gilbreth. It seeks to identify standardized times for performing certain functions and studies motion to improve work methods. The two techniques have been integrated and refined into a widely accepted method of improving and upgrading the work systems for many modern organizations.

## **XIV. PROPERTY & EVIDENCE**

### **Policy**

The Department’s Policy Manual Sections 804 and 805 provides general guidelines for the handling, booking, storage and release of property and evidence taken into Department custody. The Manual’s provisions (Lexipol) are supposed to be customized by the Department but they have not been. The pertinent Manual sections include:

- 804.3.1 Property Booking Procedures;*
- 804.3.2 Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs;*
- 804.3.3 Explosives;*
- 804.6 Property Control;*

804.7 *Disposition of Property;*

804.7.1 *Exceptional Dispositions;*

804.7.2 *Unclaimed Money;*

804.7.3 *Retention of Biological Evidence; and,*

804.8 *Inspection of the Evidence Room:*

- a) *On a monthly basis the supervisor or the evidence custodian shall make an inspection of the evidence storage facilities and practices to ensure adherence to appropriate policies and procedures.*
- b) *Unannounced inspections of evidence storage shall be conducted annually as directed by the Chief of Police.*
- c) *An annual audit of evidence held by the Department shall be conducted by a Division Commander (as appointed by the Chief of Police) not routinely or directly connected with evidence control.*
- d) *Whenever a change is made in personnel who have access to the evidence room, an inventory of all evidence/property shall be made by an individual not associated to the property room or function to ensure that records are correct and all evidence is accounted for.*

### **Industry Standard**

The California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) has conducted a great deal of research into this subject area and has captured the law enforcement industry's best practices in the POST Property and Evidence Manual.<sup>38</sup> The POST Property and Evidence Manual provides the following mission statement for the property/evidence function:

*"The law enforcement evidence/property function exists in order for an agency to receive, catalog, safely store, and maintain the integrity of evidence, found property, and property for safekeeping. The function allows for the effective prosecution of criminal offenders while confirming innocence; and victims may find truth and closure as justice is served. Lastly, law enforcement agencies have the legal obligation to restore evidence/property to rightful owners or facilitate the legal disposition of evidence/property in agency possession."*

To assist agencies with the management of the property function, POST developed, published and distributed to California law enforcement agencies the Law Enforcement Evidence & Property Management Guide. The management guide is divided into six chapters, with each chapter pertaining to one of the six primary categories of the evidence and property function:

1. Organizational Considerations  
(Organization, Personnel, Training, Policy/Procedure)
2. Documentation and Forms
3. Safety, Security, and Storage
4. Evidence and Property Handling Procedures

<sup>38</sup> The Third Edition (2013) of the guide is available for downloading on the POST website at [http://lib.post.ca.gov/Publications/evid-prop\\_management.pdf](http://lib.post.ca.gov/Publications/evid-prop_management.pdf).

5. Audits, Inventories, and Inspections
6. Evidence and Property Disposition and Purging

In addition, POST has published an Agency Self-Assessment Guide to assist agencies in reviewing their property and evidence function.

### **Practice and Improvements<sup>39</sup>**

We used the POST *Law Enforcement Evidence & Property Evaluation Self-Assessment* to conduct our evaluation. It became readily apparent that, until very recently, there has been no effort whatsoever to comply with the POST standards and, in fact, there does not appear to have been much common sense exercised either in the management or oversight of the evidence and property process. Even a cursory examination of the property and evidence function can lead to no other conclusion than the Department's entire evidence and property processes are critically and categorically flawed and wrought with untenable risk exposures.

#### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Follow the guidelines, recommendations and best practices clearly delineated in the POST *Evidence and Property Guide*. That step alone would address most of the risk exposures identified in this chapter of the report. (P&E No. 1)**
- ❖ **Submit whatever budget requests are necessary to achieve compliance with the POST *Evidence & Property Guide*. (P&E No. 2)**

### **Evidence and Property Storage Facilities**

The Department has two evidence and property storage rooms (Photos in **Appendix G**). One of the rooms is about 8 by 12 feet and is located in the police station adjacent to the Evidence and Property Technician's (EPT) office. There is also an exterior storage area that is slightly larger. A camera is in place to capture anyone entering the interior property room, but the digital media storage is on a "four day loop" and "written over" after four days. There are no cameras capturing access to the exterior evidence and property room. Both the interior and exterior rooms are alarmed and capable of being monitored from the nearby Dispatch Center. But the Dispatchers we interviewed were unfamiliar with the evidence and property alarm system and did not know if it was audible or which control panel in the Dispatch Center allowed it to be monitored.

There is no systematic key control procedure for either room and there is no written log or any other electronic process (key card) to record people entering and exiting either room.

#### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Establish a systematic evidence and property room key control procedures under the direction of a lieutenant. (P&E No. 3)**
- ❖ **Request funding and install electronic keys on both property and evidence rooms. (P&E No. 4)**
- ❖ **Install a camera to cover the door of the exterior property and evidence storage area. (P&E No. 5)**

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<sup>39</sup> Practice and improvements are consolidated in this chapter in order to promote continuity.

- ❖ **Replace the four day digital media camera storage with a 30 day storage capacity that is not automatically written over. (P&E No. 6)**
- ❖ **Implement a visitor's log and require anyone entering either room to sign in and out. (P&E No. 7)**

#### **Adequacy of the Current Facilities**

Improvements in the Department's evidence and property process have begun and a complete inventory and audit is currently underway. However, the utter state of neglect associated with the evidence and property function cannot be overstated. It is questionable if the current facility can be brought into compliance with the standards outlined in the POST Property and Evidence Manual. The City will have to weigh the cost of completely redesigning the current facility or constructing a new property and evidence storage facility. A third option is to close the facility and book everything into the Sheriff's property room. Whichever option is selected, the Department has a legal and ethical obligation to preserve the evidence it collects in a manner that allows it to be used in court later on.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ❖ **As a matter of urgency, determine the feasibility of funding the necessary improvements to the current facility OR close the facility and book all evidence and property into the Sheriff's facility. (P&E No. 8)**

#### **Evidence and Property Technician**

The current Property Officer's Civil Service classification is Evidence Property Technician, but he appears to be unaware of even the most rudimentary aspects of that job. For example, he stated he was unaware that the Department even **had any** policies governing property and evidence procedures. He was a part-time custodian for the Department prior to being assigned as the EPT nearly 20 years ago. (We did not inquire as to how that selection was made.) He was in his EPT position for approximately six years before he received any formal training. He stated that he has not received any training sponsored by the California Association of Property and Evidence (CAPE) and the Department does not have an on-going property and evidence training program in place. However, the Department's training records show that he has received extensive training on the duties and responsibilities of a P&R technician including at least two week-long training sessions, one in 2008 and the other in 2012. (It also appears that he attended a week-long training session in December 2010, but no documentary evidence of that could be readily located.)

#### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Review the process used to select the EPT for this position to ensure his knowledge, skills and abilities are consistent with the official description for that position. (P&E No. 9)**
- ❖ **Join the San Diego Chapter of CAPE. (P&E No. 10)**
- ❖ **The Department should consider the feasibility of employing an IAPE Certified Property and Evidence Technician / Manager. (P&E No. 11)**
- ❖ **Provide adequate supervision and management oversight of the property and evidence function. (P&E No. 12)**

In addition, the lack of rotation in the person assigned as the EPT can (and appears to have) lead to stagnation which is a dangerous proposition in a position that handles high-value evidence and property. We also found that no one has been trained to perform the EPT's duties in his absence. That is due, at least in some part, to the fact that the incumbent EPT has not taken more than four consecutive days off during the entire 20 years he has been in this assignment. The managers we interviewed confirmed, but were not previously aware, that he seldom takes a break from his EPT assignment.

**Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Train someone to fill in during the EPT's absence. (P&E No. 13)**
- ❖ **Ensure the EPT takes his normally scheduled vacation time off. (P&E No. 14)**

**Audits, Inventory and Purging**

Up until recently it appears there has never been an inventory of evidence and property, any audit of evidence and property or even an effort to reconcile the destruction of high risk evidence including firearms and narcotics. The EPT was unaware of how many items of evidence involving currency or the total amount of currency that was in the Department's inventory. However before we initiated this engagement, Chief Bostic had initiated a complete inventory of all evidence and property using experts from the Imperial County Sheriff's Office.

**Automated Property Management System (APMS)**

The Department does not have an APMS and uses a 20-year old "off-the-shelf" database (Alpha-5) which lacks integration with the Department's Computer Aided Dispatch System (CAD) or Records Management System (RMS). The system was not designed to track the chain of custody for property and evidence or maintain an inventory, though it has a rudimentary capacity to do so. The system does not use a barcoding procedure or have any alert mechanism for purging/dispositions. It does not include an electronic evidence digital management software suite so digital evidence is stored on compact discs and kept in a box in the EPT's office.

**Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Acquire an APMS such as EvidenceOnQ and implement a barcoding system. (P&E No. 15)**
- ❖ **Acquire an electronic/digital evidence management system such as FileOnQ. (P&E No. 16)**

**Destruction of Narcotics and Firearms**

The last narcotics destruction was over two years ago at the Southeast Resource Recovery Facility (SERRF) in Long Beach. We were informed that the EPT selects the narcotics items to be destroyed and transports them to the destruction facility accompanied by a plain clothes police officer. A plain clothes security detail follows the EPT and officer to SERRF where the EPT facilitates and manages the destruction. There are no independent verification procedures in place.

The risk exposures associated with the Department's destruction of firearms are even greater than those associated with the destruction of narcotics. The EPT selects the firearms to be destroyed and takes them to the Calexico City Shop where he shreds them. He does this alone and there is no

independent verification of the firearms being destroyed. During our site visit we observed firearms and other items slated for destruction loosely placed in a cardboard box on the floor of the EPT's office.

As mentioned earlier, POST Property Manuals and Guidelines aside, common sense alone should have precluded anyone from destroying narcotics and firearms without some form of independent verification. Even allowing an unarmed civilian EPT to transport firearms to the destruction site defies common sense. According to the EPT he asked the previous Chief of Police for someone to accompany him but his request was denied.

To say the least, the Department does not have adequate procedures in place to ensure the proper authorization, accounting, reconciliation or security for the destruction of narcotics and firearms. This is a major risk exposure and violates the core risk management principles of segregation of duties, approvals and reconciliation. We made the Administration Lieutenant aware of this deficiency and steps are being taken to correct the deficiency.

**Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Establish a policy governing the regular and periodic destruction of narcotics and firearms. That policy should include a comprehensive operations and security plan that ensure the proper authorization, accounting, reconciliation and security for the destruction of firearms and narcotics. (P&E No. 17)**
- ❖ **Designate a lieutenant to be the incident commander of for the destruction of narcotics and firearms. (P&E No. 18)**

**High Value Evidence and Valuables**

The Department does not have adequate procedures to ensure the proper security, accounting and disposition of high value evidence and valuables. It also lacks appropriate safeguards for the storage of high value evidence and property. For example, a purportedly fully automatic assault rifle was affixed to a shelf in the interior evidence and property room as a decoration. The assault rifle has a destruction authorization date over a decade old and has a "happy face" sticker attached as an ornament. There was unaccounted for currency in plain envelopes co-mingled with other evidence on the shelves of the interior property and evidence room. The Department does not have a safe for currency and jewelry or any threshold requiring deposits with City Hall. The EPT did not know how much currency was in the evidence and property room and there were no ledger entries documenting the amount of currency in Department custody.

**Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Establish adequate policies and procedures to ensure the proper security, accounting, or disposition of high risk evidence and valuables. (P&E No. 19)**
- ❖ **Remove the assault rifle affixed to the shelf in the main evidence and property room and if it no longer has evidentiary value destroy it. (P&E No. 20)**
- ❖ **Conduct regular and periodic complete accounting and audits of all currency in the Department's property and evidence room and storage room. (P&E No. 21)**
- ❖ **Acquire a floor or standing safe to store all currency and valuables and provide camera surveillance of the safe. (P&E No. 22)**

- ❖ **Establish a currency deposit threshold for currency to be deposited at City Hall. (P&E No. 23)**

### **Biological Evidence and Blood Drying Procedures**

The Department does not have a trained Evidence Technician or any Scientific Investigation or Lab personnel. The Department refers to their Property Officer as an "Evidence Technician," but he has no training in that area and he does not respond to the field or collect evidence. His duties are strictly related to the booking and retention of property and evidence.

Patrol officers and detectives are generally responsible for the collection of crime scene evidence including latent prints, clothing, photographs, DNA, buccal swabs, etc. The Department rarely requests assistance from the Sheriff's SID personnel, though they are available and are requested for major cases. Patrol officers and detectives have received basic training on the collection and preservation of evidence at their respective recruit academies, from FTOs during probation and from sporadic roll call training.

The Department does not have any commercial blood drying cabinets and the Department's procedures for the handling of wet/biological evidence are inconsistent with industry standards. For example, clothing with wet biological evidence is placed in a dirty storage locker and is not sanitized between dryings. There is no procedure to track the items of evidence that are being dried but have not yet been booked into the Evidence and Property Room. For example, we found buccal swabs in a case in a Detective Squad Room closet with no documentation indicating when, where, who and why they were collected.

When latent prints are obtained they are only sent to the Imperial County Sheriff's Lab for comparison when the officer who collected the prints, or the detective who conducts the follow-up investigation, has a possible suspect in mind and requests a comparison. Otherwise, if a request is made, the Property Officer may send the prints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

### **Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Assign all patrol and detective personnel to POST certified evidence collection and preservation training. (P&E No. 24)**
- ❖ **Request that the Sheriff's SID staff provide quarterly evidence collection and preservation training to patrol and detective personnel. (P&E No. 25)**
- ❖ **Determine the evidentiary value of the unaccounted for buccal swabs in the closet of the detective squad room and take appropriate action. (P&E No. 26)**
- ❖ **Ensure that all latent prints are input into both Federal and State data bases. (P&E No. 27)**
- ❖ **Request funding to obtain commercial blood drying lockers and implement a procedure for their proper use. (P&E No. 28)**
- ❖ **Until adequate blood drying lockers can be obtained, book all blood drying and wet evidence into the Sheriff's property room. (P&E No. 29)**

### Temporary Storage Lockers and Refrigerators

In evenings and on weekends, officers use commercial lockers for the temporary storage of property and evidence. There is no refrigerated locker storage available during the off-hours. The Property Officer has a small unalarmed refrigerator that sits loosely on a shelf in the interior evidence and property storage room, but it is not accessible during off-hours or on weekends.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ❖ **Acquire a commercial, alarmed refrigerator storage locker with multiple compartments which can be individually secured and is accessible to staff during off-hours. (P&E No. 30)**

### Narcotics Storage and Ventilation

The Department does not have adequate security for the storage of narcotics. The Department does not have a secondary locked storage room for narcotics or an HVAC ventilation system, or even a ventilation system that vents to the roof of the building. This is a Cal/OSHA violation.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ❖ **Build a secondary secured narcotics storage closet in the main property and evidence room and install an HVAC ventilation system that is consistent with Cal/OSHA requirements. (P&E No. 31)**

### Release of Property

The Department does not have established property release security procedures in place and appointments are not required. The release of property is conducted at the front desk or in the officers' lounge which is a security issue.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ❖ **Release property by appointment only and provide adequate security for the EPT during the release of property. (P&E No. 32)**

### Emergency Plan

The Department does not have an emergency and disaster plan in place to ensure the continuation of the evidence and property function in the event of an emergency. The EPT is not equipped with a personal duress alarm, a police radio, any safety equipment and there are no emergency eyewash stations.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ❖ **Identify a secondary storage site for the Department's property and evidence in the event of an emergency/disaster. (P&E No. 33)**

## **XV. FACILITIES INSPECTION**

We conducted numerous site visits during this engagement which gave us the opportunity to see the facility inside and out. Generally, the facility is adequately maintained given its age and "24/7" use. We observed the custodian regularly cleaning office spaces and he truly does an exceptional job. We

saw broken items being fixed, walls being painted and cars being repaired. In short, the Department does a good job of maintaining its facility.

That said, however, it is a simple reality that human beings tend to accumulate things and eventually those things generate clutter. That accumulation of clutter tends to be exacerbated in police facilities where people work in shifts. So we expected to see the usual disarray associated with police stations. However, the concentration of clutter in the Calexico station, particularly in some of the high-volume work areas like Records, was extraordinary. Paper is literally piled several feet high making it a wonder that anyone can find anything. We also noticed several issues deserving of attention:

1. **Earthquake Straps.** There are several cabinets and material stored on top of lockers that would come lose and fall during an earthquake. Cabinets and anything else that could fall should be secured in order to prevent them from injuring anyone.
2. **Parking Lot Gate.** The gate to the police parking lot is not secure. Anyone could enter the lot on foot or in a car.
3. **Facility Protections.** It would be beneficial to inspect the entire facility and ensure proper safety devices are in place to ensure the safety of the facility and its occupants in the event of attack. For example, there are no barriers (usually disguised as planters) to prevent someone from driving a car through the front door. Also, bullet proof glass may be appropriate for some of the windows and interior partitions.

Many agencies have adopted these and other safety measures in order to ensure the continued delivery of public safety services in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. In that regard, the Department should consider assigning a supervisory or management level person as the Department's Safety Officer and require an annual "walk through" to identify and correct any safety deficiencies.

**Recommendations:**

- ❖ **Ensure that earthquake straps are affixed to all cabinets in the facility. (Fac No. 1)**
- ❖ **Review the station security with a particular emphasis on building and parking lot security. (Fac No. 2)**
- ❖ **Assign a supervisor or manager as the Department's Safety Officer and require at least an annual safety inspection of the facility. (Fac No. 3)**

## **XVI. CONCLUSION**

Our assessment of the Calexico Police Department's basic business systems revealed significant and in some cases even potentially catastrophic risk management exposures. Those deficiencies include the way in which employees were recruited, hired, trained, disciplined and monitored. It also included the way in which personnel complaints were initiated, investigated and adjudicated as well as the reporting and adjudication of uses of force. The management controls for these critical areas of risk exposure were either nonexistent or so generic that they provide no enforceable standards whatsoever. The deficiencies included a lack of management oversight for field and detective operations as well as effective controls for the handling of high-risk evidence such as guns, money and narcotics. Finally, we found that the Department lacked any strategy or effort to engage in

Community Policing and/or Police/Community Problem Solving.

This report identifies each of those shortcomings in detail and provides practical solutions to the problems we have identified. But implementing those solutions will require a management team that is committed to the pursuit of integrity and ethical values; management oversight; organizational competence; and, consistently enforced accountability. We found ample evidence that change has begun under Chief Bostic's transparent leadership. But, the challenges that he faces cannot be overstated. His efforts to partner with the City and other government leaders, community stakeholders and the Department of Justice are only the first steps on a long road. Most of the Department's management systems need to be discarded in their entirety and replaced with new ones. That requires research, preparation of new policies and directives, training of staff on those new expectations and rigorous auditing to ensure the changes are taking place. Accomplishing those goals will require the directed and concerted effort of all the City's stakeholders. That is the only way to transform the Department into an agency that is respected and trusted by the community it serves. Anything less virtually guarantees that this entire process will need to be repeated a few years down that same road.

## Summary of Recommendations

### Administration:

1. A management-level civilian position should be created to lead Administrative Services Division. That person should be in charge of Records, Communications, Property, Forensics, Animal Regulations and Parking.
2. The Operations Lieutenant should be in charge of all sworn uniformed personnel including patrol, traffic and K-9. This Lieutenant should also be in charge of the School Resource Officers, Community Service Officers, Police Explorers and any other youth programs in which young people are in uniform. This lieutenant should be the final reviewer on all pursuits and uses of force.
3. The Investigations Lieutenant should be in charge of all investigations and should be responsible for managing the Department's community relations programs. This lieutenant should track and be the final reviewer on all personnel investigations and employee-involved traffic collisions.
4. An additional Lieutenant should be added for the next 2 to 3 years and given the primary responsibility for managing the changes that need to occur including preparation of directives, providing training on those directives and auditing compliance with those directives.
5. A sergeant should be assigned to the Investigative Lieutenant and that sergeant should be the Department's Training Coordinator as well as responsible for conducting major personnel investigations. This sergeant should also be responsible for maintaining and distributing all Department equipment.
6. The Department needs to develop a clear set of statements that define its organizational mission, vision and values.<sup>40</sup>
7. All substantive administrative projects need to be routed through the Chief's Administrative Assistant.
8. The Administrative Assistant needs to:
  - Assign each administrative task a unique project number (usually the month followed by a sequential number);
  - Assign each task a due date (if the due date can't be met the person assigned needs to negotiate a new due date);
  - Log each project into an automated spread sheet (Veritas will provide an exemplar);
  - Assign the project to the appropriate lieutenant (the lieutenant assigns the work to his subordinates, not the Administrative Assistant); and,
  - Provide any direction the person assigned may need to complete the project.
9. The Department's Police Manual needs to be revised to require a project tracking system.
10. Require field sergeants to complete a daily log to record their important supervisory activities.

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<sup>40</sup> This was communicated to the Chief and we understand this work is well underway, if not completed.

**Patrol:**

1. Establish a minimum staffing of three patrol units; assign them to Beats 1, 2 and 4; and, alternate calls in Beat 3 among the available units.
2. Consider assigning patrol units a unit designation that more closely identifies their mission and assigned beat.
3. There should be at least five and preferable six sergeants assigned to patrol. Four of the sergeants should be assigned to the four teams and the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> should be scheduled to provide them with relief.
4. Assigning officers as acting supervisors should be kept to an absolute minimum, no more than two or three times per year, and officers so assigned should be trained for that assignment.

**Dispatch:**

1. Hire an additional (ninth) Dispatcher in order to provide adequate staffing for the Dispatch Center.
2. Remove the Dispatch Supervisor from shift assignments as soon as possible so she can resume her supervisory duties.
3. Review all Dispatch Center policies and procedures to ensure they provide Dispatchers with adequate guidance and standardization.

**Calls for Service:**

1. Use caution in making long-term staffing decisions as Calexico's calls for service should increase as the community develops trust in its Police Department.
2. Expect and prepare to address an increase in reported crime.
3. Conduct a further review of call priorities to ensure it is consistent with Department and community expectations.
4. Codify the Department's expectations of call receipt and dispatching in the Department Manual including the principle that calls should be assigned by beats whenever possible.

**Community Policing:**

1. Patrol officers need to be assigned to beats and remain in their assigned beat as much as possible.
2. Patrol officers need to be encouraged to identify crime and disorder problems within their beat and be held accountable for resolving them.
3. The Department should develop a form to capture quality of life issues and community complaints that do not amount to a crime but affect community safety (real or perceived) or community disorder, e.g., men drinking and loitering in front of a liquor store or loud car repair on a public street.
4. Community complaints should be assigned to the officers working that beat and they and their sergeants should be held accountable for resolving the problem.

5. Patrol officers need to be held accountable for developing Neighborhood Watch groups within their beat.
6. The Department should hire two civilians to develop their community engagement programs. One should be assigned to work with residents in the ten public housing communities and one should work on the community at large. (HUD should be approached to pay for most if not all of the public housing coordinator.)
7. The Chief of Police should establish several Forums to meet with him and his executive staff at least quarterly. Those Forums should include:
  - Business owners.
  - Leaders of Neighborhood Watch Groups.
  - Religious leaders.
  - Social service providers (frequently churches and social service agencies are well aware of the challenges facing their clients.)
  - School administrators.
  - Student leaders from local middle and high schools.
  - Representatives from programs that provide after-school alternatives for young people.

#### **Detectives**

1. All detective personnel, including supervisors, should complete POST Basic Detective Course within their first year of assignment and all additional POST certified investigative courses to ensure the Department has a cadre of detectives who are adequately trained to provide it with quality detective services.
2. A sergeant should be assigned to detectives as soon as practical.
3. One additional officer should be assigned to detectives until the detectives have been able to attend the requisite investigative schools.
4. Once our recommended changes to the duties and responsibilities of detectives have been implemented, Investigations Unit staffing will need to be reviewed in light of its new workload.
5. Personnel complaints should be investigated by the Administrative Sergeant who reports to the Support Services Lieutenant.
6. All detective personnel, including supervisors, should complete POST Basic Detective Course within their first year of assignment and all additional POST certified investigative courses to ensure the Department has a cadre of detectives who are adequately trained to provide it with quality detective services.
7. A sergeant should be assigned to detectives as soon as practical.
8. One additional officer should be assigned to detectives until the detectives have been able to attend the requisite investigative schools.

9. Once our recommended changes to the duties and responsibilities of detectives have been implemented, Investigations Unit staffing will need to be reviewed in light of its new workload.
10. Personnel complaints should be investigated by the Administrative Sergeant who reports to the Support Services Lieutenant.
11. Establish criteria for when an officer may pursue a follow-up investigation and when the follow-up should be assigned to detectives for follow-up.
12. Ensure that a patrol supervisor and the detectives are made aware of a patrol officer's decision to conduct a follow-up investigation involving a felony crime.
13. Whether a follow-up is being conducted by patrol or detectives, a written investigative follow-up report should be required within 30 days.
14. Revise the Spillman system so a copy of all Part I crime reports is forwarded to the detective unit.<sup>41</sup>
15. Prohibit patrol personnel from closing any criminal investigation. Those decisions should fall under the purview of the detective unit and require supervisory approval.
16. Establish a case tracking system to track and monitor cases being carried by patrol and detectives along with mandatory due dates for the submission of those cases.
17. Send all felony crime reports with an identified suspect who is not in custody to detectives for follow-up investigation.
18. Detectives should either locate and arrest an outstanding suspect(s) or be responsible for submitting a warrant package to the District Attorney's Office.
19. Case clearance decisions should be made by detectives and reviewed by the Detective Sergeant.
20. Clearance decisions need to comply with the FBI's Uninformed Crime Clearance Guidelines.
21. The Department's current practice for obtaining and retaining search warrants should be codified in the Policy Manual.
22. Establish an annual inspections and audit plan for follow-up investigations that includes:
  - Arrest, booking and charge dispositions;
  - Investigative case completeness;
  - High risk (dope, money, guns, currency and valuables) evidence control;
  - Case categorization;
  - Case clearances;
  - Search warrants, affidavits and returns; and,
  - Informant control and use.

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<sup>41</sup> It is our understanding that Spillman is programmable and this change would require minimal effort. If that is not the case, then Records should forward the copy to detectives.

### **Task Force**

1. Review current interagency MOUs and renew those in which the Department will participate and notify the lead agency of those in which it will not.
2. Add a provision to the Department Manual governing interagency operations that requires advanced written approval from the Chief of Police and regular monitoring by a Lieutenant.
3. Interagency Memorandum of Understandings should require the Chief of Police's signature.

### **Personnel**

1. Update and customize the Department's Policy Manual to include a discussion on the Department's community policing efforts and the desired personal qualities an applicant should have to be successful in those efforts.
2. The City's HR/Personnel staff needs to take an active role in the Department's recruitment and selection process.
3. Locate the required DOJ fingerprint returns associated with Packages 1, 2, 4 and 6 and include them in the background investigation packages.
4. Codify the new Recruitment and Selection Plan.
5. Expand recruitment to include a State-wide search.
6. Select and fully train those officers who will be conducting background investigations.
7. Until background investigators can be selected and trained, contract with a licensed background investigation firm to conduct the Department's background investigations.
8. In consultation with the City's HR staff, all of the Department's position descriptions should be reviewed to ensure they reflect current expectations.
9. The position descriptions for sworn personnel (officers, Sergeants and lieutenants) should be updated to reflect the Community Policing Problem Solving Model being instituted by Chief Bostic.
10. The Department Manual (Section 1002) needs to be updated to reflect the Department's current practice for evaluating employees.
11. Once position descriptions are updated, the personnel evaluation forms (sworn and civilian) should be updated to reflect those revisions.
12. The Department should add a signature box and date for the Lieutenant approving an employee evaluation.<sup>42</sup>
13. Each December 1<sup>st</sup>, the Chief should issue a reminder that employees need to renew their permits for outside employment.
14. The Department should amend its Policy Manual to prohibit officers from using their Department badge and/or uniform in conjunction with any off-duty commercial venture or political activity.

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<sup>42</sup> The current evaluation reports only include signature boxes for the evaluating supervisor and the Chief of Police.

### Training

1. The Department needs to prepare a comprehensive written Training Plan for each year. That plan should be completed by December 1<sup>st</sup> of the preceding year.<sup>43</sup>
2. A sergeant (not a lieutenant) should be assigned as the Department's Training Coordinator. That sergeant can be assigned other duties, but training is a critical function and should not be added onto a field supervisor's workload.
3. The Training Committee needs to be activated and should consist of the Training Coordinator as chair, one or two field sergeants, 2 or 3 field officers, a detective and a dispatcher.
4. A written procedure needs to be established for employee's to request training.
5. Training requests for non-mandated training need to identify the officers' current level of compliance with mandated training requirements.
6. Supervisors, all of whom have the ability to ascertain if officers review training bulletins, should be responsible for ensuring their officers review the bulletins.
7. Supervisors need to conduct an annual training-needs assessment for each of their subordinates. This is best done in conjunction with annual personnel evaluations
8. The Training Coordinator should publish a monthly roll call training plan with about 60% to 70% of the sessions pre-determined and the reminder left to the individual supervisor's discretion.

### Risk Management

1. Remove any language from the citizen complaint form that could be construed as dissuading a complainant from filing a personnel complaint.
2. Require supervisors to document every community complaint and forward either a personnel complaint form or supervisor's log to their division commander.
3. The division commander should adjudicate each complaint in writing.
4. All formal complaints should be sent to IA and IA should determine the appropriate investigative entity.
5. The supervisor investigating a personnel complaint should not make recommendations regarding the complaint's adjudication.
6. There needs to be a clear written record of each adjudicator's review and findings for every personnel complaint.
7. The Chief of Police's Administrative Assistant should maintain an automated matrix of all personnel complaints.<sup>44</sup>
8. Supervisors should respond to every use of force and when they cannot they should be required to document the reason.
9. Every use of force should be reported on a use-of-force report.

<sup>43</sup> The Department obtained El Centro PD's Training Plan to use as a guide.

<sup>44</sup> The Chief's Administrative Assistant was provided with a model matrix for that purpose.

10. Every use of force should be routed to the Operations Lieutenant for review and policy determination.
11. The Operations Lieutenant's should determine in writing if the use of force was: 1) In Policy, No Action; 2) In Policy, Training; or, 3) Out of Policy.
12. The Operations Lieutenant should maintain an automated matrix that captures important information for all uses of force.<sup>45</sup>
13. The Operations Lieutenant should maintain an automated matrix that captures Supervisors need to be held accountable for complying with Department policy regarding the investigation and reporting of pursuits.
14. Department managers need to review every pursuit and maintain a matrix of information for each pursuit.<sup>46</sup>
15. Department policy needs to be amended to require managerial review and policy determination for all vehicular pursuits.
16. Department policy needs to be amended to have the Operations Lieutenant submit the CHP form after his review, not the pursuing officer.
17. Department policy should be amended to require that the CHP be requested to assume responsibility for investigating serious accidents involving a Department employee.
18. Department policy should identify the standard it uses to determine if an employee should be disciplined for a traffic collision.
19. The Department should activate a Risk Management Committee.
20. The Risk Management Committee should meet quarterly to review all high-risk activities including personnel complaints, uses of force, vehicular pursuits and traffic collisions.
21. The Risk Management Committee should also review the issuance, use and maintenance of all safety equipment to ensure those items are being deployed properly and that any perishable items are within the manufacturer's expiration or replacement date.
22. The City Attorney should attend Risk Management Committee meetings to discuss claims for damages and lawsuits as well as provide the Department with legal advice on risk-management issues.
23. Require written supervisory approval for all arrests prior to booking.
24. If the charge involves battery or assault on an officer or resisting or interfering with an officer, the approving supervisor must personally inspect and briefly interview the arrestee.
25. If the arrest involves a use of force, the supervisor reporting the use of force should be the same supervisor approving the booking and all related reports.

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<sup>45</sup> The Operations Lieutenant was provided a model matrix for that purpose

<sup>46</sup> The Operations Lieutenant was provided with a recommended matrix for that purpose.

## Records

1. Designate the Lead Records Clerk as the Department's Custodian of Records for all Department crime and arrest reports other than those maintained by specialized units.
2. Designate the Chief's Executive Assistant as the Custodian of Records for all other reports including correspondence, personnel records and personnel complaints.
3. Reduce the public hours for records and eliminate public access on Fridays.<sup>47</sup>
4. Designate one of the Records Clerks as the Lead and compensate her accordingly.
5. In consultation with the other Clerks and the Support Lieutenant, have the Lead Records Clerk identify broad issues such as prioritization and develop policies to address those issues.
6. Maintain the reduced hours for the public counter in order to eliminate the backlog of files.
7. Once the backlog is eliminated, use the extra time to prepare a Destruction of Records request.
8. Codify the policy of requiring all reports to be submitted before end of watch into the Department Manual.
9. Supervisors need to be put on notice that their approval of a report indicates they have read it, understood it, determined it to be legally sufficient and found it to be free of at least egregious spelling and grammatical errors.
10. The Operations Lieutenant needs to become more actively involved in checking the quality of completed reports. That could be as simple as selecting a "grab sample" of reports two or three times a week and reviewing them for consistency with Department standards. Any deficiencies should be brought to the approving supervisor's attention. Chronic deficiencies should result in appropriate action including, but not limited to, training or discipline.
11. Review the Records function in detail to determine if a full time supervisor and/or an additional Records Clerk is warranted.
12. Conduct a "time-and-motion" study to determine how paperwork flows through the Records Unit and make recommendations for any improvements needed.

## Property & Evidence

1. Follow the guidelines, recommendations and best practices clearly delineated in the POST *Evidence and Property Guide*. That step alone would address most of the risk exposures identified in this chapter of the report.
2. Submit whatever budget requests are necessary to achieve compliance with the POST *Evidence & Property Guide*.
3. Establish a systematic evidence and property room key control procedures under the direction of a lieutenant.
4. Request funding and install electronic keys on both property and evidence rooms.
5. Install a camera to cover the door of the exterior property and evidence storage area.

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<sup>47</sup> The Department implemented this recommendation during the course of this engagement.

6. Replace the four day digital media camera storage with a 30 day storage capacity that is not automatically written over.
7. Implement a visitor's log and require anyone entering either room to sign in and out.
8. As a matter of urgency, determine the feasibility of funding the necessary improvements to the current facility OR close the facility and book all evidence and property into the Sheriff's facility.
9. Review the process used to select the EPT for this position to ensure his knowledge, skills and abilities are consistent with the official description for that position.
10. Join the San Diego Chapter of CAPE.
11. The Department should consider the feasibility of employing an IAPE Certified Property and Evidence Technician / Manager.
12. Provide adequate supervision and management oversight of the property and evidence function.
13. Train someone to fill in during the EPT's absence.
14. Ensure the EPT takes his normally scheduled vacation time off.
15. Acquire an APMS such as EvidenceOnQ and implement a barcoding system.
16. Acquire an electronic/digital evidence management system such as FileOnQ.
17. Establish a policy governing the regular and periodic destruction of narcotics and firearms. That policy should include a comprehensive operations and security plan that ensure the proper authorization, accounting, reconciliation and security for the destruction of firearms and narcotics.
18. Designate a lieutenant to be the incident commander of for the destruction of narcotics and firearms.
19. Establish adequate policies and procedures to ensure the proper security, accounting, or disposition of high risk evidence and valuables.
20. Remove the assault rifle affixed to the shelf in the main evidence and property room and if it no longer has evidentiary value destroy it.
21. Conduct regular and periodic complete accounting and audits of all currency in the Department's property and evidence room and storage room.
22. Acquire a floor or standing safe to store all currency and valuables and provide camera surveillance of the safe.
23. Establish a currency deposit threshold for currency to be deposited at City Hall.
24. Assign all patrol and detective personnel to POST certified evidence collection and preservation training.
25. Request that the Sheriff's SID staff provide quarterly evidence collection and preservation training to patrol and detective personnel.
26. Determine the evidentiary value of the unaccounted for buccal swabs in the closet of the detective squad room and take appropriate action.
27. Ensure that all latent prints are input into both Federal and State data bases.

28. Request funding to obtain commercial blood drying lockers and implement a procedure for their proper use.
29. Until adequate blood drying lockers can be obtained, book all blood drying and wet evidence into the Sheriff's property room.
30. Acquire a commercial, alarmed refrigerator storage locker with multiple compartments which can be individually secured and is accessible to staff during off-hours.
31. Build a secondary secured narcotics storage closet in the main property and evidence room and install an HVAC ventilation system that is consistent with Cal/OSHA requirements.
32. Release property by appointment only and provide adequate security for the EPT during the release of property.
33. Identify a secondary storage site for the Department's property and evidence in the event of an emergency/disaster.

**Facility**

1. Ensure that earthquake straps are affixed to all cabinets in the facility.
2. Review the station security with a particular emphasis on building and parking lot security.
3. Assign a supervisor or manager as the Department's Safety Officer and require at least an annual safety inspection of the facility.

**Beat Map of Calexico**

Appendix B

Calls for Service 2013

Q1-2013	Priority	No. of Calls	Response Time	Service Time
	P1	159	7.1	5.8
	P2	525	10.6	10.3
	P3	1,063	14.2	12.9
	P4	1,843	12.3	12.1
	P5	134	23.4	20.7
	P6	517	13.3	11.8
	P8	619	7.2	7.0
	P9	169	17.4	13.7
	Misc	153	12.5	11.2
	Total	5,182	unk	11.5

Q2-2013	Priority	No. of Calls	Response Time	Service Time
	P1	193	8.0	6.6
	P2	492	11.5	11.1
	P3	1,118	10.5	9.6
	P4	1,790	9.5	9.5
	P5	153	14.1	11.7
	P6	563	6.2	5.7
	P8	754	9.5	9.5
	P9	143	4.0	3.1
	Misc	160	13.4	12.5
	Total	5,366	unk	9.2

Q3-2013	Priority	No. of Calls	Response Time	Service Time
	P1	203	8.1	6.8
	P2	577	10.6	10.1
	P3	1,212	15.5	14.3
	P4	1,483	9.5	9.6
	P5	165	19.2	14.8
	P6	469	3.1	2.7
	P8	934	6.1	5.9
	P9	134	4.2	3.5
	Misc	125	13.4	13.1
	Total	5,302	unk	9.5

Q4-2013	Priority	No. of Calls	Response Time	Service Time
	P1	261	7.3	6.3
	P2	493	11.2	10.9
	P3	1,222	14.2	13.3
	P4	1,589	10.1	9.8
	P5	157	22.3	19.0
	P6	438	5.1	4.6
	P8	833	7.1	6.9
	P9	117	8.4	5.8
	Misc	149	13.2	12.2
	Total	5,259	unk	9.9

<b>Patrol Activity by Beat</b>					
<b>(Includes patrol checks &amp; traffic stops)</b>					
	<b>Beat 1</b>	<b>Beat 2</b>	<b>Beat 3</b>	<b>Beat 4</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Qtr 1-2013</b>	737	1,641	1,455	1,407	5,240
<b>Qtr 2-2013</b>	745	1,640	1,465	1,558	5,408
<b>Qtr 3-2013</b>	863	1,473	1,510	1,448	5,294
<b>Qtr 4-2013</b>	908	1,439	1,307	1,500	5,154
<b>Total</b>	3,253	6,193	5,737	5,913	21,096
<b>Percent</b>	15.4%	29.4%	27.2%	28.0%	

<b>Calls for Service by Beat</b>					
<b>(no patrol checks or traffic stops)</b>					
	<b>Beat 1</b>	<b>Beat 2</b>	<b>Beat 3</b>	<b>Beat 4</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Qtr 1-2013</b>	507	1,116	1,072	940	3,635
<b>Qtr 2-2013</b>	509	1,143	1,000	1,078	3,730
<b>Qtr 3-2013</b>	544	968	982	1,005	3,499
<b>Qtr 4-2013</b>	601	961	898	1,051	3,511
<b>Total</b>	2,161	4,188	3,952	4,074	14,375
<b>Percent</b>	15.0%	29.1%	27.5%	28.3%	

Appendix D

Average Calls per Hour Quarter 1-2013								
	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat	Average per Hour
2400-0200	3.9	2.4	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.9	3.0	2.4
0200-0400	1.9	1.4	2.1	1.0	1.2	1.8	2.4	1.7
0400-0600	1.3	0.7	1.4	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0
0600-0800	0.8	1.3	1.4	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.4
0800-1000	1.7	4.2	3.2	3.5	3.5	2.8	2.4	3.0
1000-1200	1.5	3.1	3.8	2.5	3.2	2.4	2.9	2.8
1200-1400	1.9	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.0	2.2	2.9
1400-1600	1.9	3.5	4.2	4.7	4.2	4.2	2.4	3.5
1600-1800	2.7	3.2	3.2	4.0	3.4	3.9	1.8	3.3
1800-2000	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.8
2000-2200	2.8	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	1.8	2.1	2.2
2200-2400	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.0	3.1	2.9	2.3
Calls per Day	52.1	60.1	62.8	60.1	59.8	59.4	53.5	58.4
% of CFS	12.7%	14.7%	15.4%	14.9%	14.6%	14.5%	13.1%	
CFS by shift	42.8%			44.1%			(Alternates)	

Average Calls per Hour Quarter 2-2013								
	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat	Average per Hour
2400-0200	3.7	2.7	1.4	2.2	2.1	2.2	3.4	2.5
0200-0400	2.7	1.6	1.3	1.0	1.3	1.2	2.0	1.6
0400-0600	1.5	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.1
0600-0800	1.4	1.9	1.3	1.0	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5
0800-1000	1.8	3.5	2.8	2.2	3.2	2.3	1.4	2.5
1000-1200	1.6	3.9	3.4	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.3	2.9
1200-1400	2.3	4.0	3.8	4.2	2.9	2.8	2.5	3.2
1400-1600	2.6	2.5	3.5	3.8	4.1	3.8	2.1	3.3
1600-1800	2.1	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.4	3.3	2.5	3.2
1800-2000	2.8	3.3	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.7	2.8	3.1
2000-2200	2.4	2.9	1.8	2.2	2.8	3.1	2.3	2.5
2200-2400	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.7	3.0	2.8
Calls per Day	54.4	68.5	59.6	58.8	61.8	63.4	54.8	
% of CFS	12.9%	16.3%	14.2%	13.9%	14.7%	15.0%	13.0%	
CFS by shift	43.3%			43.7%			(Alternates)	

Average Calls per Hour Quarter 3-2013								
	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat	Average per Hour
2400-0200	4.3	1.6	1.4	2.5	1.8	1.8	3.3	2.4
0200-0400	3.2	1.4	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.5	3.0	1.9
0400-0600	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.6	1.3	1.2	1.1
0600-0800	1.0	1.3	1.8	2.2	2.1	1.8	1.2	1.6
0800-1000	2.9	4.3	3.7	2.8	2.4	2.8	2.6	3.1
1000-1200	2.2	3.5	3.2	3.3	3.5	2.6	3.0	3.1
1200-1400	2.0	3.4	3.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.1	2.8
1400-1600	3.1	3.6	3.3	3.4	3.3	2.7	2.3	3.2
1600-1800	2.3	2.9	3.2	2.5	3.5	3.2	2.2	2.9
1800-2000	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.8	2.1	2.8	2.5	2.6
2000-2200	2.2	2.6	2.4	1.8	2.5	2.4	3.9	2.6
2200-2400	2.3	2.0	2.5	2.3	1.7	2.8	3.0	2.4
Calls per Day	59.6	61.1	59.1	57.1	55.3	57.8	60.8	
% of CFS	14.3%	15.8%	14.2%	13.7%	13.3%	13.9%	14.6%	
CFS by shift	44.4%			41.0%			(Alternates)	

Average Calls per Hour Quarter 4-2013								
	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat	Average per Hour
2400-0200	3.3	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.5	2.5	1.9
0200-0400	2.7	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9	2.1	1.5
0400-0600	1.5	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.5	1.1
0600-0800	0.7	1.1	1.0	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.1
0800-1000	2.6	2.8	2.5	3.6	3.7	2.2	2.0	2.8
1000-1200	2.4	3.1	3.5	2.7	3.0	2.6	3.0	2.9
1200-1400	2.8	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.5	2.3	3.3
1400-1600	1.9	3.8	3.1	3.8	3.1	3.8	3.1	3.3
1600-1800	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.3	2.3	3.3
1800-2000	2.2	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.3	2.3	2.5
2000-2200	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.2	2.8
2200-2400	1.9	2.4	2.0	1.8	2.4	3.0	2.9	2.4
Calls per Day	56.6	58.9	56.2	57.8	57.5	56.1	56.0	
% of CFS	14.0%	14.6%	15.0%	14.3%	14.2%	13.9%	13.9%	
CFS by shift	43.6%			42.5%			(Alternates)	

Appendix E

Calexico Police Department Training 2010 to 2014									
Name (Last, First)	Hired	Assignment	Certificate(s) <sup>48</sup>	Patrol Training	Detective Training	Firearms Training	Civilian Training	Other Training	Total
<b>Police Officers</b>									
Acuna, Sean	11/05/08	Patrol	B-I-A	77	32			216	325
Alarcon, Rudy	11/16/00	Patrol	B-I-A	108	8			98	214
Alcazar, Mario	10/06/06	LA Impact	B	72	80			82	234
Alvarez, Nadia	04/02/14	Patrol							
Carbajal, Miguel	12/19/05	Patrol	B-I	99		16		58	173
Casillas, Luis	08/20/07	Det/Susp	B-I-A	101	76	8		44	229
Ceja, Manuel	03/06/06	Patrol	B-I	120	163			14	297
Dominguez, Victor	06/15/07	Patrol	B-I	123	10	80		106	319
Espino, Orlando	12/02/09	HIS	B-I	184	153	8		219	564
Flores, Victor	06/21/06	Patrol	B-I	123		16		94	233
Fraker, Cynthia	03/21/90	Patrol	B-I-A	162	21	8		48	239
Frazier, Stephen	04/15/07	Patrol	B-I	129	2	8		84	223
Garcia, Steven	10/24/07	Patrol	B	115	14	8		82	219
Jimenez, Jeffrey	09/15/04	Patrol (IOD)	B-I-A	119	62	40		226	447
Llanas, Albert	12/14/04	Det	B	119	28	8		47	202
Lopez, Ruben	03/16/05	Patrol	B-I-A	207	18	8		102	335
Marin, Carlos	06/20/07	Patrol (IOD)	B-I	93	14			154	261
McIntire, Timothy	05/31/00	Patrol ML	B-I-A	129		8		10	147
Navarro, Isaias	08/22/90	Patrol	B-I-A	137	37	8		31	213
Orozco, Armando	04/25/02	Det	B-I-A	190	8	8		184	390
Porras, Brian	06/21/06	Patrol	B	154	16	8		35	213
Ramirez, Juan	07/01/11	Patrol	B	114	18			4	136
Rodriguez, Gabriel	12/15/03	Det (Susp)	B-I-A	42	109			45	196
Salinas, Mario	08/23/02	Patrol	B-I-A	111	25			89	225
Sanchez, Abram	04/27/88	Patrol	B-I-A	73		8		38	119
Sundahl, Shaun	02/24/03	Patrol	B-I-A-S	36	36			2	74
Villapudua, Mario	04/18/13	Patrol	B	64		8		6	78
West, Peter	08/05/09	Patrol	B	135	25			39	199
Zamora, Gustavo	12/06/06	Patrol	B-I	133	4	8		28	173

<sup>48</sup> B=Basic, I=Intermediate, A=Advanced, S=Supervisory, M=Management

Appendix E


<b>Sergeants</b>									
Marquez, Armando	09/02/80	Patrol	B-I-A-S	133	73	8		98	312
Legaspi, Victor	10/18/89	Patrol	B-I-A-S	111	79			69	259
Duran, German	02/13/91	Det (Fired)	B-I	20	68			82	170
Uriarte, Francisco	09/18/00	Fired	B-I-A-S	161	65			118	344
Mardueno, Marco	06/15/07	Pat (Demoted)	B-I	80	108			148	336
<b>Lieutenants</b>									
Serrano, Jesus	11/01/94	Operations	B-I-A-S-M	23	24			275	322
Gerardo, Gonzalo	12/18/90	Support	B-I-A	4	24			8	36
<b>Dispatchers</b>									
Chang, Jacqueline	07/01/13	Comm							
Gonzalez, Griselda	07/01/13	Comm		4				112	116
Leon, Carmen	03/04/88	Comm	PSD					40	40
Lopez, Stephanie	11/10/04	Comm						48	48
Miramon, Leopoldo	09/26/07	Comm						104	104
Parra, Carmen	03/07/01	Comm						40	40
Ramirez, Jose	04/11/07	Comm		116				100	216
Romero, Celia	03/30/07	Comm						509	509
Valenzuela, Veronica	09/26/00	Comm	PSD/Exec					48	48

Appendix F

Vehicular Pursuit Reports 2011 to 2013

Date	Inc. No	Lt's Folder	RMS Printout
01/11/11	11-00545	No	Yes
01/19/11	11-00926	No	Yes
02/02/11	11-01780	No	Yes
06/17/11	11-2101	Yes	Yes
07/13/11	11-11881	No	Yes
09/22/11	Unknown	Yes	No
10/27/11	11-18157	No	Yes
11/27/11	11-3921	Yes	Yes
12/01/11	11-20127	No	Yes
12/03/11	11-3994	Yes	Yes
02/19/12	12-0615	Yes	No
02/28/12	12-0735	Yes	No
04/16/12	12-07090	No	Yes
05/10/12	12-08881	No	Yes
06/03/12	Unknown	Yes	No
07/26/12	12-14703	No	Yes
08/16/12	12-2749	Yes	Yes
09/01/12	12-2926	Yes	No
10/22/12	12-19533	No	Yes
12/31/12	12-4261	Yes	No
03/08/13	13-0708	Yes	No
06/09/13	13-1681	Yes	Yes
07/06/13	13-10681	No	Yes
08/27/13	13-2361	Yes	No
09/13/13	13-14627	No	Yes

### Interior Property and Evidence Room



### Exterior Property and Evidence Storage Room





**CITY OF CALEXICO  
CITY MAP**  
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT  
IMPERIAL COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

**LEGEND**

- CITY LIMITS**  
 ○ CITY OF CALEXICO  
 ○ COUNTY OF IMPERIAL
- STREET NAMES**
- A. WALKER CT
  - B. WALKER CT
  - C. WALKER CT
  - D. WALKER CT
  - E. WALKER CT
  - F. WALKER CT
  - G. WALKER CT
  - H. WALKER CT
  - I. WALKER CT
  - J. WALKER CT
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  - S. WALKER CT
  - T. WALKER CT
  - U. WALKER CT
  - V. WALKER CT
  - W. WALKER CT
  - X. WALKER CT
  - Y. WALKER CT
  - Z. WALKER CT

